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Abstract
We propose a new explanation for differences and changes in labor supply by
gender and marital status, and in particular for the increase in married
women’slaborsupplyovertime.Wearguethatthisincreaseaswellastherela-
tive constancy of other groups’ hours are optimal reactions to outsourcing la-
borinhomeproductionbecomingmoreattractivetohouseholdsovertime.To
investigatethishypothesis,weincorporateheterogeneousagentsintoahouse-
hold model of labor supply and allow agents to trade home labor.This model
can generate the observed patterns in US labor supply by gender and marital
status as a reaction to declining frictions on the market for home services.We
provide an accounting exercise to highlight the role of alternative explana-
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Weekly hours of market work in the US have increased steadily over the
last 50 years. An aggregate view, however, hides a number of important
subgroup-specic patterns in labor supply. Most striking is the substan-
tial increase in married women's hours of market work. By contrast,
married men slightly decreased their working time, while singles of both
genders increased their labor supply somewhat.
The rise in aggregate hours has been explained by demographic
changes, such as the fertility and marriage decline (Chiappori and Weiss
2006; Albanesi and Olivetti 2007), and overall productivity growth (Min-
cer 1962; Smith and Ward 1985). Concerning group-specic develop-
ments, especially the strong increase in married women's labor sup-
ply has received considerable attention. One line of argument builds
on the closure of the gender productivity gap (Galor and Weil 1996;
Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan 2003; Knowles 2007; Attanasio, Low,
and S anchez-Marcos 2008). Other explanations are based on techno-
logical improvements in home production (Greenwood, Seshadri, and
Yorukoglu 2005) or reductions in child care costs (Attanasio, Low, and
S anchez-Marcos 2008). Other studies attribute the increase in married
women's labor supply to increasing returns to experience (Olivetti 2006)
or to insurance motives (Attanasio, Low, and S anchez-Marcos 2005).
Some recent studies have pointed to social norms as additional deter-
minants of gender-specic labor supply (Fern andez, Fogli, and Olivetti
2004; Fern andez 2007).
We propose a new explanation for dierences in labor supply by gender
and marital status, and in particular for the increase in married women's
labor supply over time. The increase in labor supply of married women
may be due to the fact that outsourcing labor in home production has
become more attractive to households over time. We propose a theoret-
ical model in which married women increase their market hours as an
optimal reaction to rising attractiveness of outsourcing home labor. At
the same time, such development also induces patterns of labor supply
for married men and singles of both genders which are in accordance with
empirical evidence.
Outsourcing home labor implies that home labor is tradable. The pos-
sibility to trade home labor distinguishes our model from previous studies
of household labor supply. There are several reasons to believe that home
labor is tradable. For instance, when we think of home production being
4cleaning and washing, hiring housekeepers is an alternative to own labor.
When it comes to childcare or geriatric care as a "home good", the as-
signment of babysitters or nannies and the use of outpatient care is not
unusual. Similarly, instead of cooking on one's own, food preparation
can be outsourced to service providers.
In our model, the possibility to outsource home labor induces dif-
ferences in the amount of supplied labor between population groups.
Group-specic labor supply is also aected by the possibility to special-
ize within the household. Relatively productive agents will delegate home
production either to their spouse or to other agents in order to realize an
eciency gain. This delegation induces married men to work the most on
average, followed by single men and single women, while married women
work the fewest hours.
To make home services tradable in our model, we distinguish between
two labor markets. On a "rst market", labor is used for the production
of usual consumption goods, whereas on the "second market", labor is
used as an input for home production. Since there are two markets,
agents have the possibility to specialize. Some agents may supply home
services on the second market, while others nd it more attractive to work
on the rst market solely, depending on the wages they can earn on each
market. In addition to heterogeneity by gender and marital status, agents
in our model dier by rst-market productivity. This heterogeneity in
productivities is a driving force for the allocation of time.
Our model of group-specic labor supply can be characterized by ve
key elements: (i) home labor is tradable, (ii) the female productivity dis-
tribution is a downward spread of the male one, (iii) couples can take ad-
vantage of intra-household specialization, (iv) couples decide collectively
on labor supply1, (v) mating occurs in a perfectly assortative way2.
This structure explains dierences in subgroup-specic labor supply
which are in accordance with empirical evidence. On average, husbands
work more hours than single men because some husbands gain time to
work on the market due to intra-household specialization. Similarly, fe-
male singles work more hours on the market than married women because
some wives spend more time in home production in order to provide their
husbands with home consumption. Since men are assumed to be more
1Collective decision making explicitly incorporates that a household consists of
individuals with individual utility functions (Chiappori 1988; Chiappori 1992).
2Perfect assortative mating implies that spouses' productivities are perfectly cor-
related.
5productive than women in our model, more male singles nd it rational
to outsource home labor. As a consequence, they have more time to work
on the market than female singles.
These results hinge on the existence of a market for home labor. How-
ever, a frictionless market for home labor would have a counterfactual ef-
ciency implication. Individuals whose opportunity cost of time is higher
than the wage to be paid for home services should not work at home at
all. Obviously, this is not how people behave. There seem to be further
costs of hiring home services in addition to wage costs. For instance,
hiring home services may be associated with search costs. There may
also be quality dierences between hired and own home labor. Another
example is that outsourcing child care is associated with utility costs.
In all three examples, home-services demanders have to bear additional
costs to the monetary compensation a hired home worker receives.
Such costs create a wedge between the price of buying one's way out
of one hour of house work and the wage for one hour of house work. In
our model, this wedge corresponds to a distortionary "as-if" tax on the
market for home services, i.e. frictions on this market are modeled in the
spirit of Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2007). We show that the model
with an "as-if" tax is the reduced form to several models with structural
frictions, such as quality dierences, search frictions, and utility costs.
We suggest that outsourcing of home labor has become more attractive
over time, for instance because search costs or utility costs have declined
over time. In our model, such developments correspond to a declining
"as-if" tax on the market for home services. The induced changes in la-
bor supply by population groups are consistent with empirical evidence
for the US. When the wedge decreases, more households will decide to
hire labor for home production instead of doing these tasks on their own.
The respective singles and wives gain time to work on the rst market.
Husbands, on the contrary, are not aected by the outsourcing decision
since, in the respective households, they do not work in the household
anyway due to assumed productivity advantages relative to their wives.
Most importantly, declining costs of outsourcing labor in home produc-
tion have a particularly strong eect on married women's labor supply:
In all population groups, a declining wedge induces households to hire
more home services. This is freeing up time to work on the market. But
depending on their productivity, married women tended to work more
hours in home production than singles because wives provided their hus-
bands with home consumption as well. Being released of this type of
6work therefore has a strong impact on married women's labor supply.
We use our model for a quantitative analysis in which we determine the
sequence of "as-if" tax rates under which the model generates patterns
of labor supply by groups that best correspond to observed patterns in
the Current Population Survey (CPS). Furthermore, we provide an ac-
counting exercise in order to assess the relative importance of dierent
exogenous causes for changes in group-specic labor supply, such as the
marriage decline, productivity growth, and women's catching-up in terms
of market wages. We nd that, in our model, these changes in observ-
able factors are not sucient to account for the substantial rise in hours
worked by married women. The remaining portion can be explained by
a declining "as-if" tax on the market for home services. At the same
time, this decline does not generate counterfactual implications for other
groups' hours.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section
brie
y summarizes empirical facts on labor supply in the US over the
last decades. Section 3 describes the theoretical model. A quantitative
analysis is presented in Section 4. We discuss potential sources for fric-
tions on the market for home services in Section 5. Section 6 concludes
the paper and an appendix follows.
2 Empirical Facts
To provide the empirical background of our analysis, we recapitulate the
observed patterns in US labor market data to which we will compare
our model. Figure 1 shows average hours of market work by gender and
marital status. The data stems from the March Supplement of the CPS,
from 1962 to 2007, in the format arranged by Unicon Research.3 We
dene working age as 18 to 65 and restrict the sample to the civilian
population of that age.
Over the last decades labor supply of married women increased sub-
stantially. In the early 1960's they worked on average just a little more
than 10 hours per week. Until 2006 this number more than doubled to
over 20 hours a week. At the same time, labor supply of married men
slightly fell from somewhat below 40 hours per week to approximately
37.5 - a decrease of 6%. Both single men and women did not change their
labor supply by much. They tended to work less than married men, but
3Details are provided in Appendix A.1.
7Figure 1: Average Weekly Market Hours by Gender and Marital Status
in the US (March CPS, Persons aged 18-65)
more than married women. On average, male singles worked slightly
above, female singles slightly below 25 hours a week. Both time series
showed a slight upward trend in the 1970's and 80's.
Overall, these developments have led to an increase in aggregate hours
per capita over time, see Figure 2. During the period 1962 to 2007,
aggregate hours rose by 15%. Our model aims at replicating the ordering
of hours worked by groups, as well as the direction and magnitude of
changes in hours over time. In particular, our model should generate a
decline in married men's hours in response to a declining as-if tax on the
market for home services and a rise in married women's working hours
which is larger in absolute value. We will also examine the implications
of our model for the behavior of aggregate labor supply.
3 A Market for Home Services
In this section, we introduce a market for home labor into a collec-
tive model of household labor supply. We transfer the framework of
Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) into a heterogeneous-agents
model where households dier with respect to their rst-market pro-
8Figure 2: Aggregate Weekly Per-Capita Hours in the US (March CPS,
Persons aged 18-65)
ductivities, which is to say potential wages. The decision process within
households is modeled using a stylized version of endogenous bargaining
positions (Chiappori 1988; Chiappori 1992).
3.1 Environment
Population composition. The population consists of women (mass
1) and men (also mass 1). An exogenous fraction s of both genders
are singles, the remaining fraction (1   s) is married to an individual of
the other gender. For trade in home services to occur, households have
to dier with respect to their productivities. We assume heterogeneity
in productivities on the "rst market" where consumption goods are
produced. Home goods are produced within households using labor which
can be traded at a second market.
We incorporate heterogeneity with respect to rst-market productivi-
ties by assuming a continuum of agents with a continuous wage structure.
By contrast, all agents are assumed to earn the same wage on the second
market. Productivities on the rst market are distributed uniformly on
[0;1] for men and on [0;] for women, respectively,  < 1.4 Empirical
4The assumption of uniformly distributed productivities allows us to solve the
9evidence that productivity distributions have gender-specic supports is
provided by Albanesi and Olivetti (2006), who observe that among top-
salary receivers men earn more than women. More generally, there is
considerable empirical evidence that, even after controlling for a number
of observable characteristics, women's wages are lower than men's, see
e.g. Goldin (1990), Blau and Kahn (1997), Blau (1998).
We introduce subscripts to indicate an individual's gender, marital
status, and her position in the productivity distribution. Genders are
coded by F (or f) for female and M (or m) for male. Capital letters
indicate that the respective person is married, whereas lower-case letters
stand for singles. For instance, the index (M;0:25) refers to a married
man located at the lower .25 quantile of the productivity distribution.
We assume that mating occurs in a perfect assortative way (Becker
1973).5 As a consequence of assortative mating, rst-market productivi-
ties are perfectly correlated in marriages, i.e. a wife's wage is a constant
fraction of her husband's one:
wF;i =   wM;i, (1)
such that we can use the subscript i 2 [0;1] for the entire household,
re
ecting its position in the productivity distribution. With the as-
sumption of assortative mating, the distribution parameter  determines
intra-household productivity dierentials between husbands and wives.
Equation (1) implies that there are households where both spouses are
highly productive, but there are also households where both partners
have rather low productivities. Thus, not every woman is earning less
than every man, but every wife is earning less than her husband (if both
work on the rst market).
With the uniform distribution of wages on [0;1] and [0;] for men and
women, respectively, we have:
wM;i = i, wF;i = i, wm;i = i, wf;i = i (2)
model analytically. In the quantitative part of the paper we replace the assumption
of a uniform distribution by assuming a more realistic log-normal one.
5Becker (1973) shows that such sorting is the only stable outcome of a perfect
marriage market when marital surpluses are supermodular (i.e. if there are marital
complementarities). Empirical evidence for marital sorting is provided by Fern andez,
Guner, and Knowles (2004), who nd that the correlation of wife's and husband's
productivity is remarkably high across Europe and both North and South America.
10Preferences and technology. We assume that preferences of agents
are given by the individual utility function
ug;i =logc
1
g;i +  logc
2
g;i + (1      )log`g;i ,
g =F;M;f;m.
(3)
An individual has logarithmic preferences over her own consumption of
market goods (c1), her consumption of home goods (c2), and her time
spent on leisure (`). The utility weights  and  are positive parameters,
which sum up to less than one. The utility function is the same for all
agents.
First, we consider the decision problem for married couples. We assume
that a couple i realizes an ecient intra-household bargaining solution.
This is equivalent to assuming the household would maximize
Ui = F;i  uF;i + M;i  uM;i, (4)
which is a weighted sum of the (log) utilities of the two spouses. If
the weights on individual utilities are endogenous, this is a version of
the collective household model initially introduced by Chiappori (1988,
1992). In order to endogenize the weights, F;i and M;i, we assume that
an individual's bargaining position depends on his or her outside options.
As a simple specication of this idea, we assume that a spouse's weight








Full incomes, WF;i and WM;i, should be understood as the amount of
earnings on both markets if the entire time endowment would be spent
on paid labor. As time endowments are equal for all agents, relative
full incomes correspond to relative wages. For the intra-household deci-
sion process it makes no dierence whether the full incomes are actually
earned or not, i.e. WF;i and WM;i are hypothetic incomes.
If utility weights were xed, wives' leisure would decrease when the
gender wage gap closes, which is counterfactual to what we observe, see
Knowles (2007). Knowles argues that, when female wages rise, not only
becomes her leisure more expensive to the household, but also improves
her intra-household bargaining position due to better outside opportu-
nities. Equation (5) is a stylized version of utility weights which re
ect
11outside options. This decision rule allows us to solve the model in closed
form.6
A wife has a time endowment of one, which can be used for leisure `F;i,
rst-market labor h1
F;i, labor at home l2
F;i, and labor at the second mar-
ket h
2;S















M;i  1 (7)
Home goods have to be produced using capital ki and labor as inputs.
Labor in home production of a partnership is the sum of husband's (l2
M;i)
and wife's labor (l2
















Own and hired labor are thus perfect substitutes. Olivetti (2006) has
already studied the eects of external services in home production (pro-
duction of "child quality" in her case), but in her model these services
are complements to own labor. We model home services as substitutes to
own labor, such that they can actually "free up" time to use for market
labor.
The parameter   1 measures economies of scale in consumption of
the home good in a partnership. Such specication goes back to Barten
(1964), who argued that the provision of home goods to two people may
cost less than twice the provision to one.
















where q is the relative price of home capital. We assume that home
capital fully depreciates each period.7 p is the price for hired home
services, while ! is the respective wage earned by home-services suppliers.
A key point of our analysis is that p and ! are not necessarily equal.
If p > !, there is a wedge between the costs of hiring home services and
the compensation for supplying them. This means that an employer of
such labor has to bear further (time, utility, or direct) costs in addition
6Other decision rules such as Nash Bargaining or Equal Surplus Splitting (Knowles
2007) lead to analytically non-tractable solutions of our model.
7We address this issue in more detail in Section 4.2.
12to the monetary compensation a hired provider of home services receives.
In a short-cut way to model this wedge between ! and p, we assume that
there are further resource costs associated with hiring home labor. Since
such wedge is equivalent to a distortionary tax on the second-market
wage, we will refer to the relative wedge, , as an "as-if" tax:8
p = (1 + )! (10)
All "tax revenues" are assumed to be used in a non-distortionary way.
Singles face a similar decision problem as couples. They maximize indi-
vidual utility (3) without the possibility of intra-household specialization
and economies of scale ( = 1). Singles face the following constraints







g;i  1 (11)
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3.2 Supply and Demand
Depending on the relation between rst and second market wages, house-
holds take discrete labor market choices, i.e. they decide on which market
to work. Given the composition of the economy, couples split up into four
groups of households regarding their behavior on the market for home
services. There is
1. a top-wage group with i >
p
 that hires home services (group 1),
2. a high-wage group with
p
 > i > !
 that neither hires nor supplies
home services on the second market (group 2),
8In Section 5 we explicitly model several frictions on the market for home services
which lead to equivalent time allocations as the model in which the wedge re
ects
true resource costs. The model can therefore be understood as the reduced form to
several models with structural frictions, such as quality dierences between hired and
own home labor, search frictions on the market for home services, and utility costs
of outsourcing household-related activities. In the quality example, one hour of hired
home services does not replace one hour of own work completely. In the presence of
search frictions, a demander of home services has to bear time costs in addition to the
actual wage costs. If parents dislike outsourcing child care, this can be understood as
utility costs. In all three examples, home-services demanders have to bear additional
costs just as in the short-cut specication where the additional costs are true resource
costs. See Section 5 for details.
133. a low-wage group with !
 > i > ! where wives supply home services
(group 3), and
4. a bottom-wage group with ! > i where both, wife and husband,
supply home services on the market (group 4).
Singles do not have the possibility of intra-household specialization and
earn wages wf;i = i and wm;i = i, respectively. They belong either to
(g = f;m)
1. a high-productivity group with wg;i > p which hires home services
(group a),
2. a medium-productivity group with p > wg;i > ! that neither de-
mands nor supplies home services (group b), or
3. a low-productivity group with wg;i < ! which supplies home ser-
vices (group c).
3.2.1 Couples
Group 1: Top-wage couples. For a household in this group it is
rational to hire home services and to supply own labor only on the rst
market since both their wages (husband and wife) exceed the eective
price of hired home services. The full (potential) income of a household
of this type is the sum of the two wages, Wi = wF;i + wM;i = (1 + )i.
The household splits this full income on the goods which provide utility
according to the corresponding utility weights.
For instance, husband's leisure multiplied with its opportunity costs is
a constant fraction of full income in the optimum:






`M;i = 1       (15)
and analogously
`F;i = 1      . (16)
As both spouses do not work at home, they spend their remaining time





F;i =  +  (17)
14For the amount of hired home labor, total opportunity costs have to
equal a constant fraction of total income that is determined by the corre-
sponding utility weight and the ecient share of labor in the production
of the home consumption good:
h
2;D
i  p = (1   )Wi
() h
2;D




Hence the demand for home services of a household of this type depends
positively on the ratio of its own wage to the eective price of home
services. This ratio re
ects the "leisure price" of home services.
Group sizes are endogenous in our model. All households with i >
p

belong to the top-wage group, thus its size decreases in the price p for
home services.
With Cobb-Douglas preferences and technology, time decisions neither
depend on the price for home capital, q, nor on total factor productivity,
A, see Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) for a detailed discussion.
The same holds for the parameter , measuring economies of scale in
home production. These properties are an implication of Cobb-Douglas
technology and preferences and they do not necessarily hold under dier-
ent assumptions. However, Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) show
that for these parameters to have a substantial impact on hours worked,
one would need to assume rather extreme forms of complementarities or
substitutabilities, which come along with other, counterfactual, implica-
tions.
Group 2: High-wage couples. This group does not act on the second
market since it is neither rational to hire nor to supply home services.
Labor supply decisions are given by:
h
1
M;i =  +  (19)
h
1
F;i =  +    
 1(1   ) (20)
Due to husband-wife wage dierentials it is ecient to specialize. Mar-
ried women in this group supply less labor on the rst market than their
husbands but spend more time on home production. Thus these wives
provide home consumption not only to themselves but also to their hus-
bands.
15The high-wage group contains households with
p
 > i > !
, thus its size
increases in the wedge between p and !. If there is no such wedge, this
second group disappears and every household either supplies or demands
home services. This is not what we observe in reality, which is giving
support to our assumption that there exists a wedge as measured by the
parameter , see equation (10).
Group 3: Low-wage couples. In this group, husbands work solely
on the rst labor market, whereas wives work on the second market and
at home. The full income of a household in this group is therefore given
by Wi = i + !.
As husbands in this group do not work at home they spend their non-
leisure time on the rst market,
h
1
M;i =  + . (21)
Wives' total non-leisure time is  +  as for their husbands. For time
spent on home production optimization requires
l
2
F;i  ! = (1   )Wi
() l
2








The wife supplies her remaining time at the second market:
h
2;S




Labor supply on the second market hence increases in the wage for home
services and decreases in rst-market wages. The latter eect is an in-
come eect. When the husband receives a salary rise, the household
becomes richer and hence wishes to consume more home goods. This in-
crease has to be accompanied by a rise in the wife's labor input into this
production. Thus remaining time to be supplied on the second market
decreases.
The size of this group is ( 1   1)! and therefore depends on male-
female productivity dierentials.
Group 4: Bottom-wage couples. Households in this group would
earn that low wages at the rst market that both, husband and wife,
oer their labor at the second market. Full income of these households is
16(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
male hours female hours labor 2










group 1  +  0  +  0 (1 + )
i 2 [
p
;1] (1   ) i
p




]   1(1   )
group 3  +  0 0  +  0
i 2 [!; !
]  (1   ) i
!
group 4 0  +  0  +  0
i 2 [0;!]
Table 1: Summary of Couples' Labor Supply and Demand Decisions
therefore Wi = 2!. For both household members, optimization requires

















= 2(1   )
(24)








= 2   2(1   )   2(1      ) = 2 + 2 (25)
As wages on the second market do not dier by productivity or gender,
the allocation of these working times across spouses is indetermined. We
can only state how much they will supply together. In the following, we
will assume that households in the bottom-wage group split both types
of labor equally among wife and husband.9 Total home-services supply
of a household is a constant in this group, but the group size, which is
!, increases in the wage for home services.
Average labor supply of husbands and wives. Table 1 summa-
rizes supply and demand decisions of the four groups of couples. Group
sizes can be read from the rst column. Aggregating individual decisions
9For the following analysis, it is sucient that households in this group split labor
equally on average.
17provides average market hours by gender for couples. Market hours refer
to total compensated work and consist of rst- and second-market labor
supply. Average market hours of married men are derived by integrating
columns (2) and (3):
HM =  +    (1   )  ! (26)
When the wage for home-services increases, compensated male labor de-
creases since group 4 grows and in this group, men do also work in the
household and less on the market than men in other groups.
Average compensated hours of wives are calculated by integrating la-











































Wives' hours increase in the home-services wage ! but decrease in the
price p. When ! rises, more women receive male help in the household
(group 4 grows) and some women (those in group 3) face rising oppor-
tunity costs of non-market time. If p rises, group 1 becomes smaller and
in this group, wives work the most.
3.2.2 Singles
Singles of both genders form a continuum each, which can be split up
into three groups with respect to their behavior on the second labor
market. High-productivity singles nd it rational to hire home services
in order to gain time to work on the rst market (group a). Singles with
a medium productivity neither demand nor supply home services (group
b). Low-productivity singles supply home services (group c).
Within the groups, decisions are the same for both men and women.
The only dierence is that for men, more individuals belong to groups
a and b, due to the gender-specic productivity distributions. For men
wm;i = i holds and thus individuals i 2 [p;1] belong to group a, i 2 [!;p]
are in group b, and only those men with i 2 [0;!] nd themselves in
group c. Women's productivity is described by wf;i =   i, thus only
those with i 2 [p=;1] are in group a. Female singles i 2 [!=;p=]
belong to group b, and those with i 2 [0;!=] to group c.
18Group a: Highly productive singles. In this group, single women
have a full income of Wi =   i, while single men's full income is Wi =
i. Equivalent to the decisions of couples in the previous section they
consume the amount 1       of leisure time. Since they do not work




g;i =  +  (28)
Optimization with respect to hired home labor requires that total oppor-
tunity costs equal a constant fraction of full income that is determined by








Group b: Medium-productivity Singles. Singles in this group
work on the rst market and at home. They allocate their time in the
following way:
`g;i = 1       (30)
h
1
g;i =  +  (31)
l
2
g;i = (1   ) (32)
Group c: Low-productivity Singles. Full income of singles in this
group is given by Wg;i = !, independent of gender. As any single, they
consume 1       of leisure time. They allocate the remaining time
on supplied home services and labor at home. The opportunity cost of
working at home is the second-market wage !, therefore:
l
2
g;i  ! = (1   )  Wg;i
() l
2





g;i =  +  (34)
Average labor supply of singles. Table 2 summarizes the time al-
locations of singles. Once again, we consider average market hours by
gender. Integrating total labor of types 1 and 2, one can see that average
19(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
range range hours labor 2







group a i 2 [
p
;1] i 2 [p;1]  +  0 (1   )
wg;i
p
group b i 2 [!
;
p
] i 2 [!;p]  +  0 0
group c i 2 [0; !
] i 2 [0;!] 0  +  0
Table 2: Decisions of Singles (g = f;m); wf;i =   i, wm;i = i
compensated labor of female singles decreases in the second-market price
p and is independent of the second-market wage !:




The home-services wage ! does not aect hours of single women
because changes in ! only induce some women to change the market
(women changing from group b to group c). But these women still keep
working the same amount of time. However, decreases in p motivate
some women to hire someone for doing house work and to increase their
activity on the rst market (women changing from group b to group a).
Analogously to female singles, we can derive average market hours of
single men by integrating total labor of both types, as given in columns
(4) and (5) of Table 2:
Hm =  +    (1   )  p (36)
Average hours of single men also decrease in p and are independent of !.
The economic reasons are the same as for women. Men's response to a
change in the second-market price p is weaker than that of women.
3.3 Equilibrium
We now analyze the equilibrium of the market for home services and
its dependency on the relative wedge, , between the price paid and
the wage received for home labor, p = (1 + )!. Having solved for
equilibrium prices, p and !, we can analyze average market hours by
gender and marital status as given by equations (26), (27), (35), and (36).
In particular, we can examine how hours worked respond to changes in
.
20Integrating the home-services supply and demand decisions of cou-
ples reported in Table 1 and those of singles reported in Table 2, and
accounting for their respective masses (1   s for couples, s for singles,
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 2   1)(1   )

! (38)
Dening D1 := 1
2(1   ) > 0, D2 :=  1 +  2 + s    2s > 0,
and S1 :=

( 1 + 1)( + )   1
2(1   s)( 2   1)(1   )

, equalizing
supply and demand for home services results in:10




S1 + (1 + )D1D2
1=2
(39)




S1 + (1 + )D1D2
1=2
(40)
The price p for home labor is increasing in the "as-if" tax  and the






 (1 + )
 1=2  S1 
((1 + )D1)1=2






 (1 + )
 3=2  (S1 + 2(1 + )D1D2) 
((1 + )D1)1=2
(S1 + (1 + )D1D2)3=2 < 0
(42)
3.4 Hours Worked in Equilibrium
In this section we derive labor-supply patterns suggested by our model.
The data suggests the following three observations with respect to market
hours by gender and marital status (see Section 2): (i) Husbands work
the most, followed by male singles and female singles. Married women
10S1 is surely positive if  > 0:2 or  < 4 or any linear combination of these
two restrictions holds, which we assume. If labor is exceedingly important in home
production and home consumption provides much utility, the income eect of a rise
in ! potentially dominates the substitution eect. This would lead to a supply curve



































Figure 3: Market Hours of Population Groups
work the fewest hours. (ii) Over time, husbands' hours decreased and
all other groups' hours increased. (iii) Comparing the magnitudes of the
changes, wives' change was by far the strongest. We now illustrate that
the model outlined in Section 3 is able to generate the ordering of hours,
i.e. HM > Hm > Hf > HF. Moreover, the model generates the direction
and relative magnitude of the changes as a (comparative-static) response
to a decrease in the "as-if" tax on the market for home services, .
Ordering of average labor supply. Figure 3 summarizes labor sup-
ply decisions of singles and couples. Labor supply consists of both rst
and second-market hours. The vertical axis refers to a household's posi-
tion in the productivity distribution, i: We can see that the ordering of
aggregate labor supply by groups is as in the data. We consider men rst.
For any i; comparing the husband's labor supply to the corresponding
labor supply of a single man (associated with the same productivity),
yields the following: No husband works less but some work more than
the corresponding single (those with p > i > !). Husbands and singles
in this range do not outsource home labor. For singles, this means that
they have to work in home production on their own, while husbands can
take advantage of intra-household specialization.
22A similar reasoning applies to male and female singles, as well as for
female singles and wives. Since men are more productive than women in
our model, more male singles nd it rational to outsource home labor.
As a consequence, they have more time to work on the market. Female
singles work more hours on the market than married women because some
wives (those with ! < i < p=) spend more time in home production
to provide their husbands with home consumption. Since each interval
in Figure 3 has the same impact on all four group-specic averages, the
ordering of average labor supply is HM > Hm > Hf > HF; as in the
data. This result is shown analytically in Appendix A.2.
Changes in group-specic labor supply. We suggest that changes
in group-specic labor supply over time are the result of a declining as-if
tax on the market for home services. We already know from the previous
section that, when the tax rate  falls, the home-services wage ! increases
and the price for these services p decreases. To illustrate the eects on
hours worked, we consider a situation where, due to a declining , !
increases from !0 to !1 and p declines from p0 to p1.
 Figure 4 presents an overview of how market labor changes in such
experiment. All couples with i > p0= or i < !0 will not change their
labor supply decisions as they stay in groups 1 or 4, respectively. Fur-
thermore, no husband in a household with i > !1 will change his labor
supply, he might change between groups 1 to 3, but that does not have
an impact on his market hours. Only husbands in households i 2 [!0;!1]
change their market hours. These households move from group 3 to 4
and hence husbands begin to work in the household because there are no
longer intra-household market-wage dierentials. Overall, average mar-
ket hours of married men decrease.
Wives in households with i 2 [!0;!1=] all increase their market hours.
Some of them move into group 4 and get male help in the household.
Others just face higher opportunity costs of not working on the market
due to the increase in !. Households i 2 [p1=;p0=] move from group 2
to group 1 and decide to hire home services, thereby saving time for the
wife which she uses for market labor. No wife works less but some work
more, that is to say average hours of married women increase.
Comparing the magnitudes of the changes, the female eect domi-
nates the male one. Considering households i 2 [!0;!1] in Figure 4, it
is apparent that all wives in this range at least compensate their hus-
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Figure 4: Market-Labor Changes in Response to a Decreasing As-If Tax,

24these households. Overcompensation occurs because opportunity costs
of non-market time increase due to the wage rise on the second market.
Total market-labor supply of these households thus increases. All other
husbands record constant hours in our hypothetical situation, whereas
there are some other wives who also increase their market time. Thus,
in reaction to a fall in , the rise in hours of married women is stronger
than the decline in male hours. This comparative-statics result is shown
analytically in Appendix A.2.
Considering singles, the changes in p and ! only aect the amount
of supplied labor of those singles who change from group b to group
a, as illustrated in the right part of Figure 4. These singles decide to
hire home services and use the freed-up time to work on the rst labor
market. Thus they increase their labor supply. Therefore, total labor
supply of both groups of singles rises since no single decreases his or her
labor supply. Since there are more female than male singles changing
groups (p= > p), the female eect is larger than the male one.
Considering columns (2) and (3) of Figure 4, we can compare the
change in labor supply of female singles to that of married women and
see that the eect of wives is the stronger one. Consider those women
with i 2 [p1=;p0=]: Married women in this range increase their labor
supply by more than the respective single women. The reason for both
groups' increase in market labor is that hiring home services is freeing
up time. But married women in this range did work more at home
than singles as they provided their husbands with home consumption as
well. Hence, being released of this type of work has a stronger impact
on married women's labor supply than it has on single women's hours.
Outside of this range, no female single alters her labor supply, but some
married women decide to work more. Thus the eect on married women
is larger than that on singles and therefore wives experience the strongest
change of all groups.
To illustrate these eects with a quantitative example, Figure 5 shows
how the model reacts to linear decreases in the "as-if" tax  for the
parameter constellation  = 0:4,  = 0:2,  = 0:33,  = 0:75, and
s = 0:5. The gure resembles Figure 1 qualitatively, underlining the
model's capability to replicate the observed patterns in labor supply.
25Figure 5: Market Hours Response to a Linear Decrease in the "As-If"
Tax,  ( = 0:4,  = 0:2,  = 0:33,  = 0:75, s = 0:5)
4 Quantitative Analysis
We have shown that the model presented in the previous section is able
to replicate the observed labor market trends qualitatively as a response
to a declining "as-if" tax on the second market. The "as-if" tax is a
reduced-form representation capturing several frictions on the market
for home services, which may hamper outsourcing of household-related
activities, see Section 5 for a discussion. In this sense, the tax rate 
is a deep parameter itself. Our next aim is to use our model to back
out a sequence of as-if tax rates that best enables our model to match
real-world patterns in hours by gender and marital status as displayed
in Figure 1.
4.1 Productivity Distribution
So far we have assumed a uniform distribution of productivities, which
allowed us to solve our model in closed form and to derive comparative-
static properties analytically. When we want to quantify deep parameters
of our model, we should make the specication of the productivity distri-











Figure 6: Relation between Male and Female Productivity Distributions
the uniform distribution by a log-normal one. Analogously to our pre-
vious specication with a uniform distribution, we capture male-female
wage dierentials by assuming that the female productivity distribution






where G is the female cumulative log-normal density and F the male
one. Figure 6 illustrates the relation between F and G. For any particular
wage w0, more women than men fall short of this wage, which implies that
G  F 8w. Thus men are earning more than women in the sense of rst-
order dominance. Assumption (43) implies that the entire wage structure
in a specic year is described by three parameters, mean and variance
of the male productivity distribution as well as the gender dierence .
Under assortative mating, a husband with rst-market wage w is then
paired with a woman earning   w.
The choice of productivity distribution aects aggregation and equilib-
rium prices. By contrast, it does not aect individual decisions for given
prices as discussed in Section 3.2. For instance, total second-market labor























i  f(i) di,
(44)
where f() is the density function and F() denotes the cumulative dis-
tribution function. As before, this quantity is derived by integrating the
fth column of Table 1, taking into account the density of the wage dis-
tribution. Analogously, we calculate second-market supply and demand
of all other population groups. Aggregating over groups results in the
following excess demand function:
X =(1   )p
 1 
 
[(1   s)(1 + ) + s]
R 1
p= i  f(i) di
+s
R 1
p i  f(i) di + (1   s)! 1 R !=
! i  f(i) di
!







We use numerical techniques to determine the equilibrium ! for which
excess demand for a given  is zero.
We then use the equilibrium values for ! and p = (1+)! to calculate
market hours by gender and marital status, which are given by:
HM =  +    (1   )F(!) (46)












! i  f(i) di

(47)
Hm =  +    (1   )F(p) (48)





These moments are the analogs to equations (26), (27), (36), and (35),
which measured hours worked under uniformly distributed productivities.
We will match the moments HM, HF, Hm, and Hf to their empirical
counterparts by choosing values for  and thereby implicitly for p and !.
4.2 Parameter Choices
We take preference parameters and home production elasticities as con-
stant over time. The equipment share of output in home production, , is
28taken from Knowles (2007), who calibrates this number to 0:08 in order
to match equipment spending as a share of total consumption. Jones,
Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) choose with 0:22 a higher value for this
elasticity. Similarly to Knowles (2007), we nd that the exact number
chosen for  within this magnitude has no substantial in
uence on the
quantitative results.
To characterize preferences, the relation between the weights on market
and home consumption is crucial. The absolute values of the weights and
thus the weight on leisure stand in direct relation to the chosen weekly
time endowment.11 Knowles (2007) chooses 118 hours as weekly time
endowment and a relative weight on leisure of 0:66. Since Knowles (2007)
works with log utility as we do, we use these numbers. To derive the ratio
of the taste for market consumption, , and for home consumption, ,
we build on Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003), who assume CES
utility. We translate the CES weights into Cobb-Douglas weights by
setting the CES substitution parameter to zero. This yields =  2=1,
thus we set  = 0:22 and  = 0:12.
In the quantitative analysis, we allow the composition of the economy
to change over time. To quantify the fraction of singles in the economy,
s, we extract a time series of the share of non-married individuals from
CPS data. This time series is depicted in Figure 7.
We implicitly assume complete depreciation of home capital each pe-
riod. This is an extreme assumption. It allows us to abstract from
the capital accumulation decision and to concentrate on the decision
whether to outsource home labor. Taking incomplete depreciation into
account would not aect the outsourcing decisions since capital - once
it is accumulated - does aect the productivity of own labor in home
production and that of hired home services in the same way. Incom-
plete capital depreciation would give rise to several complications, such
as the predictability of future frictions on the market for home services,
i.e. whether changes in  are predictable to agents or come as a surprise.
With incomplete depreciation, the capital stock can not be reduced in-
stantaneously after a decrease in . This could give rise to overshooting
phenomena or muted responses, which we exclude by abstracting from
accumulation. Doing so bears the technical advantage that we can solve
11A large time endowment and a high valuation of leisure can result in the same
choice of non-leisure time as a small time endowment and a low utility weight on
leisure. Thus, the question is how much of an individual's non-labor time one actually
denes as leisure.
29Figure 7: Parameter Choices: Share of Singles s (Non-Married Individ-
uals, March CPS, Persons aged 18-65)
for each period's decisions separately.
The remaining technological parameters of our model are the Barten
scale, , total factor productivity in home production, A, and the relative
price of home equipment, q. As shown in Section 3.2, these variables
have no impact on the allocation of time given that decisions are not
linked intertemporally. Therefore, we can ignore them in the quantitative
analysis.
4.3 Methodology
In order to solve the model, we need to choose a set of parameters charac-
terizing the distribution of rst-market productivities. In order to ensure
that our quantitative exercise is consistent with the underlying structural
model, we have to take into account the model's predictions on labor
market choices. Labor market choices determine whether rst-market
productivities of agents are actually observable or not. According to
our model, agents having lower rst-market productivities than !t de-
cide to work on the market for home services and consequently, their
rst-market productivities should not be observable in year t. Since the
equilibrium value for !t depends on the as-if tax t, labor market choices
30and the observability of rst-market productivities depend on this deep
parameter as well. For this reason, our quantitative exercise needs to
determine combinations of  and the parameters characterizing the pro-
ductivity distribution that are consistent with each other. In order to
achieve this, we determine  and the productivity parameters in an iter-
ative way. The iterative procedure is performed separately in each year
and can be described as follows.
1. To obtain a rst guess for the parameters of the productivity dis-
tribution in a specic year t we t log-normal distributions to all
strictly positive hourly wages in our selected sample in this year
using Maximum Likelihood. We do so for both genders separately
in order to obtain the means, mfemale;t and mmale;t, and the stan-
dard deviations, female;t and male;t, of the gender-specic normal
distributions of log wages in year t. Under the assumption that the
female wage distribution is a downward spread of the male one in





, it must hold that
female;t = male;t (50)
and mfemale;t = mmale;t + lnt. (51)
Relation (50) is shown by Browning, Chiappori, and Weiss (2009)
as a stylized empirical result and allows us to describe the wage
structure in our model by just one variance. To extract a value for
t, we use the estimated parameters for mmale;t and mfemale;t and
calculate t as
t = exp(mfemale;t   mmale;t). (52)
Then, we use the parameters of the tted male distribution and





. Since the entire wage
structure in our model economy is described by the parameters
referring to the male productivity distribution along with , we
drop the index male and summarize the productivity parameters
by mt, t, and t.
We then dene a vector  t containing the parameter values of our
model for year t. This vector comprises , , and , which are
constant across years, as well as st, mt, t, and t:
 t =
 
   st mt t t
0 (53)
312. Taking the values in  t as given, we determine the value for t that
best enables the underlying structural model to match mean hours
worked by gender and marital status in year t. We choose that t
that minimizes a measure of the distance between the model and
empirical moments, whereas the vector of moments comprises mean
hours worked by gender and marital status, see equations (46) to
(49).
Formally, let H t(t) denote the vector of model moments for a
given t and a given parameter vector  t, and let ^ Ht denote the
corresponding empirical moments. Our estimate ^ t is the solution


















t is a weighting matrix, which determines the relative im-
portance of the individual moments in determining ^ t. Thus, in
each year, we have an overidentied system with four moments to
be matched and one parameter to be estimated. Minimization is




t , we use the inverse of a diagonal matrix with the sample vari-
ances of mean hours worked by gender and marital status along the
diagonal.
3. With the value for ^ t resulting from step 2 and the current pa-
rameter vector  t, we identify those agents who decide to work
on the second market. Observed wages for those agents should
not in
uence the identication of the distribution of rst-market
productivities. For men, the fraction of individuals working on






re-estimate the parameters of the productivity distribution we use
a censoring routine. This censoring routine ts log-normal dis-
tributions to the upper 1   F(!) quantile of male wages and to





quantile of female wages. The Maximum-
Likelihood estimation thereby takes into account that it deals with
left-censored data. As in step 1, the gender dierence t is calcu-
lated as t = exp(mfemale;t   mmale;t). The parameters mt and t
are again taken from the tted male distribution (the one obtained
using censored data).
32Figure 8: Estimated Gender Productivity Dierence 
As long as the resulting values for t, mt and t are not suciently
close to those in  t, we update  t with the new productivity param-
eters.12 We then proceed with step 2 using the updated parameter
vector  t.
The nal parameterization re
ects a combination of productivity pa-
rameters, t, mt, t, and the as-if tax, t, for which the resulting labor
market choices are consistent with the selection criterion to determine
the parameters of the productivity distribution. When the iterative pro-
cedure has converged, we proceed with the next year.
4.4 Results
Figures 8 to 10 summarize the results of the moments-matching exercise
described in the previous section.
The solid line in Figure 8 shows the estimated time series for the gender
productivity dierence t. The series indicates that women are catching
up to men in terms of rst-market productivities. The rst guess for
12We stop the iteration either if the distance between  t in the current and the
previous iteration does not exceed a pre-specied (small) value or if we observe an
oscillating, non-converging behavior of  t.
33Figure 9: Backed-Out Sequence for 
this parameter, which we derived from the entire data set without taking
into account labor market choices, is depicted by the thin dashed line in
Figure 8. Compared to this rst guess, our nal parameterization shows
similar gender dierences in productivity.
Figure 9 displays the backed-out sequence of "as-if" taxes. The se-
quence indicates that outsourcing of household-related activities has be-
come easier over time, in the sense that  declines steadily. However,
there still exists a wedge between the wage received for home services
and their associated price in recent years. This implies that there are
agents who neither supply nor demand labor on the market for home
services (groups 2 and b in the model).
The backed-out sequence for  also shows 
uctuations at business-cycle
frequency. The pronounced downward trend in  makes us condent that
the results are not driven by these 
uctuations.
We insert the estimated values for  into the model in order to illustrate
the extent to which our model is able to replicate the observed patterns in
hours worked. Figure 10 displays the actual time series of hours worked
by gender and marital status, together with the series of hours worked
implied by our model under the estimated sequence ^ t. Actual data
moments from the CPS are solid lines, while the dashed lines are their
model counterparts.
34Figure 10: Per-Capita Hours under the Backed-Out Sequence for  versus
Actual Per-Capita Hours in the CPS
Figure 10 suggests that our model provides a reasonable description of
hours worked by married individuals, while it has diculties in match-
ing the level of hours worked by singles. In particular the increase in
married women's labor supply is well captured. For husbands, the model
replicates the downward trend in hours worked. According to our model,
singles should work more hours than they actually do.
4.5 Accounting for the Changes in Hours
To shed some light on further issues regarding our model, we present an
accounting exercise for the rise in aggregate market hours and for the
changes in market hours by groups. In the literature, there is a number
of explanations for these developments. Some studies emphasize demo-
graphic changes, such as the fertility and marriage decline, see Chiappori
and Weiss (2006) and Albanesi and Olivetti (2007). The marriage de-
cline potentially raises aggregate hours because female singles tend to
work more hours than married women. Another explanation attributes
the rise in hours to overall productivity growth (Mincer 1962; Smith and
Ward 1985). Rising wages increase the opportunity costs of not work-
ing. Two further explanations arise from the study of household models
35of labor supply: the closure of the gender productivity gap (Galor and
Weil 1996; Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan 2003; Knowles 2007; Attana-
sio, Low, and S anchez-Marcos 2008) and technological improvements in
home production (Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu 2005). A closure
of the productivity gap leads to less intra-household specialization and
thus to more female market labor. Improvements in home technology,
that is to say cheaper access to home capital, such as vacuum cleaners or
microwaves, is freeing up time that married women can nowadays work
on the market.13
If trading home services has become easier over time, this is an addi-
tional explanation for rising hours. As shown in Section 3.4, a declining
"as-if" tax on the market for home services increases activity on this
market. This leads to rising hours of married women as well as in the
aggregate.
We now use our model and try to assess the relative importance of
the aforementioned explanations for the rise in hours. In our model,
the respective causes for the changes in hours can be represented by
changes in exogenous parameters. Specically, the marriage decline can
be captured by an exogenous increase in s. An exogenous increase in the
mean of the productivity distribution, m, represents overall productivity
growth. The parameter  measures the gender productivity gap.14
13A number of recent studies has pointed to social norms as additional determinants
of gender-specic labor supply. Fern andez, Fogli, and Olivetti (2004) and Fern andez
(2007) provide cross-sectional evidence that culture and social norms have a sub-
stantial in
uence on working decisions. Another argument for the increase in mar-
ried women's labor supply is that increasing returns to experience make maternal
leaves more expensive, see Olivetti (2006). In the presence of uncertainty, labor sup-
ply of married women also has an insurance motive, see e.g. Attanasio, Low, and
S anchez-Marcos (2005) for the case of idiosyncratic earnings risk and Peters (1986)
and Parkman (1992) for the case of divorce risk.
14Improvements in home technology can be expressed by increases in home total
factor productivity A. Capital enhancing improvements are equivalent to reductions
in the relative price for home capital, q. Both parameters, however, do not in
uence









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































37To isolate the eects, we insert the time series for st, mt, and t dis-
cussed in Section 4.2 into our model one after another, holding the other
parameters at their 1961 level. This way, we rst shut down all but
the marriage-decline channel and then include the other channels in a
cumulative fashion. The aim of this accounting exercise is to highlight
the role of the explanations for the rise in hours in a model where home
labor is tradable. Specically, we ask the question whether allowing for
time-varying frictions on the market for home services, as measured by
the parameter , provides additional insight with respect to changes in
subgroup-specic labor supply over time.
The results of the accounting exercise are summarized in Table 3. Over
the period 1961 to 2006, aggregate hours worked per capita increased by
15%. The disaggregation by gender and marital status displayed in col-
umn (2) illustrates that the substantial increase in married women's labor
supply (increase by 114%) is the driving force for the rise in aggregate
hours.
Columns (3) to (6) display the results of our model when we incorpo-
rate information one by one. The third column refers to the case where
we set m, , and  to their 1961 levels, but use the full time series for
the parameter s. Under this scenario, aggregate labor supply per capita
in 2006 exceeds that of 1961 by 3.17% in our model. Average market
hours did not increase within groups. This reveals that the increase in
aggregate hours is a compositional eect in the rst place. A similar
pattern emerges if we additionally allow mean productivity to rise over
time (at the same time allowing for changes in ), see column (4).15
Column (5) displays the changes in hours when we allow  to change
over time, in addition to s, m, and . The rst entry refers to the case in
which we used the time series for  which is consistent with labor market
choices, the values in parentheses are obtained with the rst-guess series
for  (see Section 4.3). Qualitatively, conclusions do not depend on which
series we use. In line with Jones, Manuelli, and McGrattan (2003) we
nd that the closure of the productivity gap plays an important role
when accounting for the rise in hours. This factor explains an additional
3 to 5 percentage-point increase in aggregate hours, depending on the
specication. Even more important so, if women are catching up in terms
of productivity, this has substantial eects at the subgroup level. Women
increase their labor supply due to higher opportunity costs and in the
15These results suggest that general-equilibrium eects of changes in s, m, and 
(via ! and p) on hours are negligible.
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case of married women also due to improved intra-household bargaining
positions. This eect is more pronounced when productivity gaps are
calculated from the entire sample.16 Concerning men, the increase in 
leads to reduced labor supply. The negative sign for the change in single
men's hours is counterfactual to what is observed in the data.
The numbers displayed in column (5) illustrate that a considerable por-
tion of the changes in hours remains unexplained by the factors marriage
decline, productivity growth, and productivity gap closure. If we want
to use our model to generate changes in hours in the magnitude as those
reported in column (2), we need to allow for changes in . Column (6)
shows that the calibrated sequence for  brings the growth rates in hours
closer to their real-world counterparts.17 It is noteworthy that account-
ing for changes in  yields improvements in all ve moments reported in
Table 3 (the change in hours of single men is now positive, though too
large).
While the numbers reported in Table 3 refer to a beginning to end-
16The relatively large dierence between both specications is due to the fact that
in 1961 the dierence between the nal parameterization for  and the rst guess is
above average, see Figure 8.
17Here we used the series for  which is consistent with labor market choices.
39of-period comparison, Figure 11 provides a year-by-year view on average
hours worked by married women. The gure once more illustrates that
exogenous changes in observable variables, such as s, m, and , are not
sucient to account for the entire rise in labor supply of married women.
Our accounting exercise shows that the inclusion of an unobservable fac-
tor measured by parameter  can ll this gap.
5 Discussion
In our model, the parameter  measures a wedge between the cost of
outsourcing one hour of labor in home production and the compensation
for one hour of supplied home services. This wedge is a measure of how
easy one can outsource home labor. It has been documented empirically
that the possibility to outsource home labor has an in
uence on female
labor supply. For instance, the survey article of Del Boca and Locatelli
(2006) isolates three important determinants of cross-country dierences
in female labor supply: the availability of child care, the quality of such
services, and the cultural perception of women. We understand  as a
proxy for these determinants and argue that several developments have
made outsourcing home labor more attractive, corresponding to reduc-
tions in .
The unobservable factor  can be understood as a reduced-from repre-
sentation of several structural frictions on the market for home services.
We now consider examples for such frictions that lead to equivalent time
allocations as if there was an "as-if" tax .18 Chari, Kehoe, and Mc-
Grattan (2007) point out that models with short-cut frictions can lead
to equivalent results as models with structural frictions. We pick up this
idea and provide structural interpretations for .
For instance, suppose that there is no "as-if" tax, i.e. p = !, but there
are quality dierences between hired and own home services. Specically,



























ects that one unit of hired time does not replace one unit of own
18Detailed proofs of the equivalences are presented in an appendix, which is available
on request.
40time completely, given ~ q > 0.19 An otherwise identical model with such
production function yields the same time-use and time-demand decisions
for any household and thus the same time allocations as the model with
the tax  presented in Section 3.
Technological progress which makes hired home services a better sub-
stitute to own labor corresponds to a decrease in ~ q in the production
function above. Albanesi and Olivetti (2007) provide empirical evidence
that such progress has indeed occurred over the last century. Further-
more, there have been governmental programs in order to increase the
quality in the child care sector, see Blau and Mocan (2002). A decrease
in ~ q is equivalent to reductions in  in our benchmark model.
An alternative structural interpretation of the wedge between p and !
are search costs. For instance, a lack of transparency on the market for
home services may create search costs that demanders have to bear in
addition to the actual wage costs. Consider a case where the time  that
a household j searches for a home service provider is proportional to the











With this specication, time allocations are equivalent to the case in
which there are true resource costs in the form of a distortionary tax .
Over the last decades, the trade of home services shifted from the
shadow economy onto formalized markets. For instance, Attanasio, Low,
and S anchez-Marcos (2008) report an increase in "organized child care"
by more than 100% from 1977 to 1994, while other, informal, forms of
child care remained rather constant. This increases in market trans-
parency may have reduced search frictions, as measured by the parame-
ter ~ s. A decline in ~ s aects time allocations in an equivalent way as a
declining as-if tax .
A third interpretation of our model is related to utility costs and social
norms. Parents who outsource child care may suer from being apart
from their children. In the past, mothers who outsourced child care may
have suered from discrimination. Similar discrimination may aect the
decision whether to outsource geriatric care. It seems plausible that these
19If home services are less productive in home production than own labor, this is
equivalent to the case where home services are simply more expensive.
20These time costs have to be born by all household members.
41issues have prevented in particular women from supplying market labor.
This point is emphasized by Fern andez (2007), who argues that female
labor supply "may depend on how a woman conceives of her role in the
household, [...] or how she is treated as a result of her choice" (p. 6).
One can formalize this idea in a model in which hired home services
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In this utility function, the pain an individual suers from discrimination
is proportional to the share of income he or she spends for hiring home
services.21 Assuming no wedge between price and wage for hiring home
services, p = !, but replacing the utility function (3) by (57) yields
equivalent time allocations as if there was a tax  on the second market
wage.
Over the last 50 years, the perception of working mothers in western
societies has changed. From the World Values Survey there is evidence
for signicant cohort eects in the answers given to questions related to
the acceptance of working women during their kids' childhood. Younger
cohorts seem to be less reluctant to outsourcing home labor than older
ones.22 These developments are potentially leading to less disutility when
outsourcing home labor, i.e. they lead to a decrease in ~ d. In consequence,
non-wage costs of home services decrease, which is again equivalent to a
declining "as-if" tax  in our model.
6 Conclusion
This paper has provided a new explanation for the observed gender-
specic patterns in labor supply in the US. Our key argument was that
dierences in labor supply by population groups can be understood as
optimal reactions to the possibility to outsource household-related activ-
ities. A main aspect of our model therefore was that home services are
tradable. The diculties associated with trading home labor have an
important in
uence on the allocation of time.
21This relation can be motivated by the idea that for very rich households, employ-
ing personnel has always been accepted.
22A detailed discussion of our results from the World Values Survey is presented in
Appendix A.3.
42To investigate the role of tradable home labor, we have introduced a
market for home labor into a household model of labor supply. Agents
can thus decide whether to work in home production on their own or to
hire someone for doing it. A prerequisite for such specialization is the
presence of heterogeneity in productivities. On the basis of individual
households' labor supply and specialization decisions, we solved for an
aggregate equilibrium.
We argued that the market for home labor is subject to several fric-
tions and modeled market frictions as a wedge between the price of buy-
ing one's way out of one hour of house work and the wage for one hour
of house work. In our model, this wedge corresponds to a distortionary
"as-if" tax on the market for home services. We have illustrated that a
declining "as-if" tax is an explanation for changes in subgroup-specic
labor supply over time. The model displays comparative-static proper-
ties that resemble the real-world patterns qualitatively. In particular,
it generates an increase in married women's labor supply which is the
largest one of all groups.
In a quantitative analysis, we have backed out a sequence of "as-if"
tax rates which best enables the underlying structural model to match
mean hours worked by gender and marital status on a year-by-year basis.
The backed-out sequence indicates that outsourcing of household-related
activities has become easier over time, in a sense that the wedge declines
steadily.
We have also presented an accounting exercise in order to highlight
the role of alternative explanations for the rise in hours in a model where
home labor is tradable. We found that exogenous changes in observ-
able factors, such as the marriage decline, productivity growth, and the
productivity gap closure, are not sucient to account for the entire rise
in labor supply of married women. The accounting exercise has revealed
that allowing for an unobservable factor capturing frictions on the market
for home services can ll this gap.
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A Appendix
A.1 CPS Data
Our data stems from the Current Population Survey (CPS) in the for-
mat arranged by Unicon Research.23 The CPS is a monthly household
survey conducted by the Bureau of the Census. In the CPS, respondents
are interviewed to obtain information about the employment status of
each member of the household 16 years of age and older. Survey ques-
tions covering hours of work, earnings, gender, and marital status are
covered in the Annual Social Economic Supplement, the so-called March
Supplement Files.
The sample of the CPS is representative of the civilian non-
institutional population. Our selected sample comprises civilians aged 18
to 65, which is a standard denition of working-age population. The time
period spanned by our data is 1962-2007. Data on hours and earnings is
retrospective and refers to the previous year. In all our calculations, we
use weights.
Our quantitative analysis is based on cross-sectional rst moments
measuring average hours per capita by gender and marital status. Fig-
ure 1 in the paper displays time series for these variables. The weekly
hours variable is "hours worked last week at all jobs", which is the only
information on hours worked which is available for all years and compara-
ble across years. Other studies have documented that this variable yields
similar results as the variable "usual weekly hours by number of weeks
worked", which is not available for all years, see e.g. Knowles (2007) or
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2008).
23See http://www.unicon.com/.
46We dene a person as being married if the respondent answered the
relevant question with "married, spouse present" (after Unicon recode).
All other individuals are dened as being singles. The share of singles in
our data is depicted in Figure 7.
We compute wages as annual earnings divided by annualized hours
worked. In CPS, gross annual earnings are dened as income from wages
and salaries including pay for overtime. Nominal earnings are de
ated
with the CPI and expressed in 1992 dollars. Annual hours worked are
calculated as the product of weeks worked last year and hours worked
last week. The sample for which wages are calculated is restricted to
people who worked at least 10 hours a week.
A.2 Proofs of Static and Comparative-Static Re-
sults
A.2.1 Average Hours Worked
Average market hours by gender and marital status are given by equa-
tions (26), (27), (35), and (36):
HM = +    (1   )  !














Hf = +    (1   ) 
p

Hm = +    (1   )  p
Since p > !, it holds that HM > Hm. One can also state directly that
Hm > Hf because
p
 > p. It remains to show that Hf > HF, which can
be simplied to:
0 >   (1   )






























which is true for any non-negative  since  < 1. Therefore, the ordering
of average market hours is HM > Hm > Hf > HF.
47A.2.2 Changes in Hours Worked
In Section 3 it has been shown that @p=@ > 0 and @!=@ < 0. Taking
derivatives of average hours by groups with respect to  yields:
@HM
@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. Thus the change in married women's
market hours is the strongest one of all groups.
A.3 Values Survey
In this Appendix, we illustrate that the perception of family and the
importance of social norms have changed over time. We do so by an-
alyzing related questions from the World Values Survey. In the World
Values Survey, there is a number of questions related to the acceptance
of working women during their kids' childhood.24 A rising acceptance
of working mothers may be an implication of declining discrimination of
outsourcing household-related activities.
In the 1990 US survey, there is a statement "A pre-school child suers
if his or her mother works", on which subjects were asked whether they
agree or not. We construct an average response by assigning the value of
2 to "strongly agree", 1 to "agree", 0 to "don't know" or "no answer",
 1 to "disagree", and  2 to "strongly disagree". The upper left panel in
24The World Values Survey is a worldwide investigation of sociocultural and politi-
cal change. Up until today (2009), four waves of the survey have been conducted. The
survey is based on interviews with nationally representative samples in 80 countries.
Most questions ask for agreement to statements in a multiple-choice fashion. Avail-
able country-specic data on given answers is disaggregated by various characteristics
of the respondents, including birth-cohort intervals.
48Figure 12 illustrates the average answer of dierent birth cohorts to this
statement.25 The statement received an average reply of 0:40 from those
born before 1940, those born between 1940 and 1960 answered with 0:18,
whereas younger respondents answered 0:10 on average.
Similarly, average agreement with the statement "A working mother
can establish just as warm and secure a relationship with her children as a
mother who does not work" rose from 0:64 among those born before 1940
to 0:90 in the young generation born after 1960 (see the upper right panel
in Figure 12). Both ndings indicate that working during childhood of
one's kids has become more accepted.
The World Values Survey also suggests that a traditional perception
of family with working husband and house wife seems to receive growing
rejection. In the 1990 survey, subjects born after 1960 agreed to a mea-
sure of 0:83 with the statement "Both the husband and the wife should
contribute to household income", but those born before 1940 only gave
an average answer of 0:46. These observations suggest that disapproval
of working women has decreased, which is possibly an implication of
increased acceptance of outsourcing home production, e.g. child care.
At the same time, people take it less and less serious what others think
about themselves. In the 1995 survey, the measure of agreement with the
statement "I make a lot of eort to live up to what my friends expect" is
0:34 for those born before 1945, whereas it is only 0:11 for people born
after 1965. This allows the interpretation that a potential discrimination
has less impact on decisions. Overall, we regard these results from the
World Values Survey as supportive for our hypothesis that utility costs
when hiring external home services have decreased over time.
25Since the surveys are not consistent over time, we have to use answers disaggre-
gated by birth cohorts to indicate changes in values over time. Doing so assumes that
values are imparted during childhood.
49Figure 12: Average Agreement with Statements regarding Family and
Child Care; Data Source: World Values Survey
50